Smuggled Explosives Seen As Main Threat
A federal commission
investigating the tragic events of September 11, 2001 claims the
FAA failed to adequately prepare for hijacking prevention and
focused too much on a perceived threat from explosives smuggled
aboard planes
The preliminary report by the National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks Upon the United States said that in a presentation to
airline and airport officials in early 2001, the FAA discounted the
threat of a suicide hijacking because there was "no indication that
any group is currently thinking in that direction."
In July 2001, the FAA issued a warning to air carriers but did
not mention suicide hijackings. Instead, it focused on the
possibility that some terrorist groups might conceal explosive
devices inside luggage.
For months after the attacks, Bush administration officials
maintained there was no indication terrorists were considering
suicide hijackings. But the report said the FAA's Office of Civil
Aviation Security officially considered such a possibility as early
as March 1998.
The panel's finding follows earlier disclosure of a 1999 report
prepared for the National Intelligence Council that warned of
suicide hijackings.
The commission report acknowledged there was no specific
intelligence indicating suicide hijackings would occur but said the
FAA still had a responsibility to protect the flying public against
such a threat.
"Without actionable intelligence information, to uncover and
interdict a terrorist plot in the planning stages ... it was up to
the other layers of aviation security to counter the threat," the
report said.
The 10-member, bipartisan commission was established by Congress
to study the nation's preparedness before September 11 and its
response to the attacks, and to make recommendations for guarding
against similar disasters.
On Monday, the first day of a two-day public hearing, the
commission said U.S. authorities missed some obvious signs that
might have prevented some of the September 11 hijackers from
entering the country.
Government officials
have said the 19 hijackers entered the country legally, but the
panel said its investigation found at least two and as many as
eight had fraudulent visas. The commission also found examples in
which U.S. officials had contact with the hijackers but failed to
adequately investigate suspicious behavior.
For example, Saeed al Ghamdi was referred to immigration
inspection officials in June 2001 after he didn't provide an
address on his customs form and had only a one-way plane ticket and
about $500. Al Ghamdi was able to persuade the inspector that he
was a tourist.
The panel also found that at least six of the hijackers violated
immigration laws by overstaying their visas or failing to attend
the English language school for which their visas were issued.
And Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, believed to be the mastermind of the
September 11 attacks, exploited the fact that customs officers did
not routinely collect fingerprints to obtain a visa, even though
federal authorities in New York indicted him in 1996 for his role
in earlier terrorist plots. He never entered the country and was
apprehended after the attacks.
The commission said part of the problem was a lack of
coordination among immigration officials and a focus on keeping out
illegal immigrants rather than keeping out potential
terrorists.
The commission detailed other government missteps prior to
September 2001:
--Three of the hijackers, al Ghamdi, Khalid al Mihdhar and Hani
Hanjour, submitted visa applications with false statements about
never previously applying for a visa, something that could have
been easily checked.
--One hijacker, Ziad Jarrah, entered the United States in June
2000 on a tourist visa and then enrolled in flight school for six
months. He never filed an application to change his status from
tourist to student. Had the immigration officials known, it could
have denied him entry on three subsequent trips.
Also Monday, the commission said it can't finish its final
report by the May 27 deadline imposed by Congress and asked for an
extension of at least two months. The Bush administration and
Republican congressional leaders have said they oppose such a
move.
Commissioners decided they needed more time because the group
had been bogged down by disputes with the administration and New
York City authorities over access to documents and witnesses,
according to a person familiar with the commission who spoke on
condition of anonymity.