Warns That Runway Collisions Remain A Real Danger
Citing a serious near
collision of two jumbo aircraft in Chicago last July, the National
Transportation Safety Board, at a public meeting Tuesday, called
again for effective action by the FAA to counter the danger posed
by potentially catastrophic runway collisions.
The Board was reviewing its Most Wanted List of safety
improvements, a list that calls for action by federal agencies on
the most critical transportation safety issues.
Expressing great disappointment at the FAA's continued refusal
to take appropriate action, the Board also removed from the list a
recommendation that children under two years of age be restrained
on airliners for take off and landing and during periods of
turbulence.
The NTSB added a new aviation-oriented issue area to the Most
Wanted list: Air taxi crew resource management training.
Established in 1990, the Most Wanted List highlights specific
recommendations the Board believes would significantly reduce
transportation deaths and injuries.
"Our Most Wanted List
puts extra pressure on our nation's transportation safety
regulators to act more quickly on our recommendations," said NTSB
Chairman Mark Rosenker (pictured, right).
"We've made progress, but this year's list again shows that
there are numerous areas that need improvement and they need
improvement now. The Board will continue to push aggressively for
implementation of the measures needed to make our safe
transportation system even safer."
In addition to pinpointing important safety issues, the Most
Wanted List also rates agencies by the timeliness with which they
act to implement the recommendations. At Tuesday's meeting, the
Federal Aviation Administration received five unacceptable
timeliness ratings.
Aviation Issues on the Most Wanted List:
Runway Incursions -- This issue has been on the
Board's list since it's inception in 1990. The FAA completed action
on a number of objectives to make ground operation of aircraft
safer. However, these incidents continue to occur with alarming
frequency. The FAA indicates that during fiscal year 2005 there
were 327 incursions, and during 2006 there were 330. A system
introduced by the FAA provides warning to air traffic controllers,
but not to the flight crews, a fact that severely reduces the
amount of time that pilots have to react to an impending incursion.
Recommendation: Implement a safety system for ground movement that
will ensure the safe movement of airplanes on the ground and
provide direct warning capability to the flight crews.
- Timeliness Classification: Unacceptable.
Fuel/Air Vapors -- Operating transport-category
airplanes with flammable fuel/air vapors in fuel tanks presents a
risk of explosion that is avoidable. Center wing fuel tank
explosions have resulted in 346 fatalities in four accidents since
1989. There also have been several non-fatal fuel tank
explosions, the latest of which occurred earlier this year in
India. After the TWA 800 accident in 1996, the Board issued
both short and long term recommendations to reduce the potential
for flammable fuel/air vapors in aircraft fuel tanks. The
short-term recommendation was closed in an unacceptable status
because the FAA took no action. The FAA has committed to
action on the long term recommendation by Fall 2007.
Recommendation: Complete rulemaking efforts to preclude the
operation of transport- category airplanes with flammable fuel/air
vapors in the fuel tank on all aircraft.
- Timeliness Classification: Acceptable (progressing
slowly).
Aircraft Icing
-- The consequences of operating an airplane in icing conditions
without first having thoroughly demonstrated adequate
handling/controllability in those conditions are sufficiently
severe that they warrant a thorough certification test program. The
FAA has not adopted a systematic and proactive approach to the
certification and operational issues of airplane icing.
Recommendation: Complete research on aircraft
structural icing and continue efforts to revise icing certification
criteria, testing requirements, and restrictions on operations in
icing conditions. Evaluate all aircraft certified for flight in
icing conditions using the new criteria and standards.
- Timeliness Classification: Unacceptable.
Audio, Data and Video Recorders --
Investigators must have information rapidly, effectively and
efficiently in order to determine the factors related to an
accident. Automatic information recording devices, such as Cockpit
Voice Recorders (CVRs) and Flight Data Recorders (FDRs) have proven
to be very useful in gathering pure factual information. This
information results in the development of timely, more precise
safety recommendations that are likely to reduce future similar
accidents. Recommendation: In addition to adopting a 2-hour CVR
requirement, require the retrofit of existing CVR's with an
independent power supply, and require that existing FDRs and CVRs
be on separate generator busses, with the highest reliable power so
that any single electrical failure does not disable both. Require
the installation of video recording systems in small and large
aircraft. Require the recording of additional needed FDR data for
Boeing 737s.
- Timeliness Classification: Unacceptable.
Crew Resource
Management (CRM) Training for Part 135 Flights - Part 121
and scheduled Part 135 operators are required to provide pilots
with CRM training in which accidents are reviewed and skills and
techniques for effective crew coordination are presented. The
Safety Board has investigated several fatal aviation accidents
involving Part 135 on-demand operators (air taxis such as that
involved in the crash that killed Senator Paul Wellstone in 2002)
where the carrier either did not have a CRM program, or the CRM
program was much less comprehensive than would be required for a
Part 121 carrier. Although the FAA has agreed in principal
with the recommendation, no discernable progress has been
made.
Recommendation: Require that Part 135
on-demand charter operators that conduct dual-pilot operations
establish and implement an FAA-approved CRM training program for
pilots in accordance with Part 121.
- Timeliness Classification:
Unacceptable.