"Realistically, There Is No Such Thing As A Dangerous Staffing
Level"
The National Air Traffic Controllers
Association called upon the Federal Aviation Administration
Thursday to retract the following statement attributed to FAA
spokesperson Ian Gregor in a California newspaper: "Realistically,
there is no such thing as a dangerous staffing level."
Gregor, speaking to the North County Times about an ongoing
tuberculosis scare at the Southern California Terminal Radar
Approach Control (TRACON) facility in Miramar, CA, appeared to be
answering a question about the effect on air safety should
controllers at the facility become sick when he was quoted as
saying the following, "Realistically, there is no such thing as a
dangerous staffing level. Safety is always our top priority. In the
worst-case scenario, if we did have a bunch of people call in sick,
we'd reduce services. We could keep planes further apart. Normally
we have them three to five miles apart. We could separate them
further and slow down the volume."
"We call on the FAA to reject this comment, recognizing that
controller staffing levels are, first and foremost, a safety
issue," NATCA President Patrick Forrey said.
"Controllers keep safety as our top priority and we agree with
the FAA's stated desire to 'reduce services' for safety reasons
when staffing reaches a critical level. But the FAA should never
put itself in a position to 'reduce services' and negatively impact
the flying public because it failed to staff the system
appropriately."
To illustrate his point, Forrey outlined some examples of where
slowing traffic to compensate for fewer controllers may have
impacted safety:
An operational error incident on Aug. 17, 2005 at the
Raleigh-Durham (NC) tower occurred on a midnight shift where there
was only one air traffic controller on duty. The controller had
responsibility for nine aircraft; six airborne, one departure and
two ground movement, and was watching an additional three.
This event reportedly prompted the FAA's Vice President of
Terminal Services to issue guidance reiterating the FAA's policy
that during midnight shifts at facilities with both radar and tower
functions two controllers should normally be on duty performing
those responsibilities.
"Clearly, the FAA determined that there was indeed a dangerous
staffing level that must be avoided," Forrey said.
The Comair Flight 5191 crash on the morning of Aug. 27, 2006
occurred during a Lexington, KY, tower midnight shift in which the
FAA staffed it with only one controller, instead of the two
required by the FAA as per the guidance issued after the
Raleigh-Durham incident.
A serious runway incursion occurred on July 5, 2007 involving
the New York/JFK tower because of an error made by an overloaded
controller working the lone ground control position. The agency did
not reduce service or slow the traffic volume, according to the
union.