Did aviation security improve in the past year, or are we still
an accident waiting to happen?
By ANN Associate Editor Juan Jimenez
Since 9/11, the subject of aviation security has morphed from a
source of employment for recent immigrants, to one of the top
national and international priorities of most countries, developed
or not. Clearly, the ability of a group of hijackers to use
aircraft as weapons of mass destruction has forever changed the
landscape of commercial air travel.
In an ideal world, we wouldn't be discussing this subject, but
security in the aviation industry is a huge task that evolves and
mutates on almost a daily basis. The reason is simple -- if the
threat evolves, so must the defensive strategy to deal with that
threat. Ironically, even if the threat is not perceived as an
evolving one, any defensive strategy must still evolve to keep the
threat from taking advantage of stagnation and habit.
How do we begin to
approach the construction of an opinion on the state of aviation
security? Aviation security cannot be approached as what it is not,
a monolithic entity with a path that clearly defines where it came
from and where it is going. Aviation security is a term that
encompasses a great number of areas, each with its own
requirements, challenges and goals, and within those areas a
distinction must be made between general and business aviation and
the world of scheduled airline service. That said, let us
begin.
Ground Security
In the general aviation arena, the industry has taken a very pro
active approach to the security of the premises in and around
airports. This is so precisely because access to general aviation
facilities has historically been much more open than that of
airports with scheduled airline service. Without easy access, it
becomes much harder to attract the customers who might become our
next generation of pilots, mechanics and other skilled personnel.
The more relaxed atmosphere of GA facilities is also crucial to the
ability of the airport to serve the needs of those who view it as
an easy access point to the community the airport serves, for
business or personal reasons.
When it comes to GA
airport security, the Aircraft Owner's and Pilots Association has,
in our opinion, taken the lead with its comprehensive airport
security program. Leveraging the cadre of Airport Support Network
volunteers, AOPA has designed and executed a program that tackles
the issue from all angles with education programs, videos, posters
with warnings and contact information for suspicious activities,
and with a constant stream of follow up information and reminders
of the importance of GA security.
The program has been very effective, as evidenced by some of the
high-profile incidents that have been brought to light after media
attempts to gain ratings and circulation numbers at the expense of
general aviation. When it comes to GA ground security, 2004 has
seen positive change. Besides, it appears that the government has
reached the sensible conclusion that things like little badges are
not what protects the country from someone hell-bent on using GA
aircraft for something other than pleasure or business. Instead, it
is the GA community itself, alongside a policy that assumes that
anything entering a TFR or other restricted airspace that is not
positively identified as a friend is a foe, that keeps GA
secure.
Major airports with scheduled service, however, have not fared
as well. Airport management teams have certainly stepped up
security programs to protect their perimeters and grounds, but
there have been a number of incidents in the past year in which we
have seen not only unauthorized entries into the facilities, but
also individuals exploiting their access to airports to benefit
criminal activities. Granted, this last one is nothing new, but one
would think that enhanced security would make it much harder to ply
trades such as the import of illegal drugs. Southeastern airports
seem particularly vulnerable to this type of activity, and there is
no escaping the conclusion that if criminals can take advantage of
lax security at an airport, so can terrorists.
Another area of scheduled service airport security that could
use improvement is that of background check requirements for
personnel with unescorted access rights. Instead of trying to run
background checks on the passengers and doing silly things like
assigning people to color-coded groups -- something this editor had
not seen since the days of grade school field days -- the
Department of Homeland Security ought to be looking at the most
likely source of access to large aircraft by terrorists, ground
support personnel. No one should be able to obtain unrestricted
access to areas such as aprons and ramps, let alone aircraft,
without submitting to a thorough background check. In addition,
there should never be a repeat of the February TSA fiasco in which
an internal audit found nearly 20,000 screeners working inside the
airport secure areas prior to their background checks having been
completed.
Passenger and Baggage Security
This subject is almost
entirely an airline travel issue, though the business aviation
community, and particularly the charter operators, has implemented
measures to increase security screening of customers and their
accompanying passengers, along with their luggage.
When it comes to airline travel, this is the major issue that
easily absorbs the vast majority of funding and thought. The fact
is that we have reached the limit of what humans can do to try to
ensure that people do not bring prohibited items into aircraft.
About the only measure that the TSA can take to improve the job
screeners perform without the aid of technology is to do something
as simple as ensuring that screening rules and procedures are
uniformly applied across the system. There are few things more
frustrating than making an outbound trip with part of your
belongings but not being able to make the return trip with all your
property, and having a screener give you the lamest possible
excuse: "If they let you do that at that airport, they were
wrong."
In the technological arena, we are definitely making progress
towards improving the security of baggage and passengers. Engineers
have developed hardware and software that gives screeners the
ability to peer into our bags and our bodies in ways no one would
have thought possible just a short decade ago. Some feel that
technology allows security personnel to see too much of the
travelling public, but in our opinion that is the unfortunate price
that we must pay in this day and age in order to keep commercial
travel as secure as humanly possible.
There are other facets of passenger security that can be
improved through technology. One of these is the process of risk
assessment, not only to identify threats to security but also to
determine what passengers are not a threat to security. The
government agencies responsible for aviation security are putting
quite a bit of emphasis on the former, but we believe that
implementing programs to address the latter might help to
significantly improve security. Think about it -- how much
information about yourself would you be willing to make available
to the government in exchange for not having to make long security
lines at the airport? What information would the government want
from you in order to grant you expedited passage through security
checkpoints? By relieving security agents from most or all of the
burden of having to screen you and your baggage, the resources
required to do so can spend more time screening other passengers
for potential threats.
In our society, where many citizens are wary of giving up their
privacy for any reasons, this concept might be more difficult to
implement that in other countries where citizens are used to giving
up rights and privacy in return for safety. Nevertheless, we
believe the idea is worth exploring.
In-Flight Security
There is no doubt that
we have made significant progress improving in-flight security in
commercial airline travel. The cockpits are now equipped with
reinforced doors and surveillance cameras that allow the crew to
monitor the cabin. Cabin crews have been pro active in asking for
more training and tools to help ensure in-flight safety. The
programs meant to provide firearms to cockpit crews are moving
along slowly, but in this editor's opinion, this is a good
thing.
Clearly there is still much disagreement on whether or not
firearms belong in an aircraft in the hands of anyone other than a
law enforcement officer with very specific training to perform air
marshal duties. Participation in programs to arm cockpit crews with
lethal weapons should remain strictly voluntary, and those who
choose to participate should be very carefully screened. Much more
emphasis should be given to other forms of defense such as
non-lethal weapons and the use of flight maneuvers and
pressurization equipment as a means of defense against anyone
seeking unauthorized access to any airliner cockpit while in
flight.
In-Flight Defensive Countermeasures
The use portable defense systems by terrorists in offensive acts
against all types of aircraft has become an important issue. There
are many types of weapons available to anyone with the right
contacts and the right amount of cash which could be used for this
purpose, and no shortage of unscrupulous sellers.
Some progress has been made in discussions of how best to deal
with this threat, but the biggest roadblock, as usual, is what it
will cost to equip aircraft with defenses against the threat, and
who will pay the bill. Operators of private and corporate aircraft
who believe they are vulnerable to such a threat are free to make
their own choices, but most of the nation's airlines are in
extremely fragile financial condition and cannot afford to equip
their fleet with such equipment. Should the taxpayer take over the
burden of paying for something like this, or should those who use
the airline services be the ones to pay based on more taxes piled
on top of air fares? Perhaps a combination of the two? Should the
defenses be active or passive? Those are questions for which
answers have yet to be found. Let us hope that those answers are
found in a pro active, rather than tragically reactive manner.
In closing, ANN believes that in the areas we have
discussed in this piece, we are making progress in aviation
security. Every once in a while we take a step backwards, mostly
due to human nature and the fact that we are all creatures of
habit. However, we are learning from our mistakes, and those whom
we have given the responsibility of securing commercial and general
aviation are taking their jobs very seriously and working very hard
to make sure those mistakes are never repeated.