BA May Demonstrate Competitive Advantage of Perceived
Safety
'One level of security'
may not be what the flying public wants. Not only does the
government-mandated program not allow for deviation (thus making
the system's weaknesses easier to exploit), a government-mandated
minimum is just that -- a minimum -- and it covers only what the
government thinks is important, often driven by political favors
that need to be repaid.
Competition to provide 'the safest' airline may prove to be a
better solution. Airlines can use expert advice to see just what
threats are most-likely, and which countermeasures are most-likely
to thwart them, leading to efficiencies unheard-of in government
programs, while having the added benefit of confusing terrorists,
who can't possibly learn each airline's systems.
As we told you Saturday, British
Airways, the largest airline outside the US, is now considering
adding anti-missile technology to selected aircraft. Reporters were
told by an airline spokesperson that BA is talking with both Boeing
and Airbus about what such installations would take.
The industry is becoming increasingly aware of the threat that
(particularly) small, portable shoulder-fired missiles could pose
to passenger flights. Last year, in Kenya, such a missile missed an
Israeli airliner; this year, several people have been caught with
these weapons, most-recently, an August arrest of suspected
smugglers in the USA.
Australia's Prime Minister, John Howard, last week warned of the threat, as well.
BA did in fact stop flying to Saudi Arabia in the wake of an
alleged plot to take down an airliner there; it resumed its service
to the oil-rich nation just last Friday.
Just what technologies BA is considering have not been made
public; therefore, estimates of costs, deliveries and
implementation dates would be purely speculative.
The additional equipment -- for detection as well as for
deployment -- is readily-available in military applications; but
several obstacles prevent 'bolt-on' implementation: military
equipment is generally not available to civilian markets; its life
is generally shorter than airline applications would demand; its
calibration and sensitivity can also be issues -- a Rafale, for
instance, has a radically different mission than an A340 does.
Colateral considerations -- microwave emissions, for instance --
can also pose health hazards when some military equipment is used
outside its intended arena. Some military protocols -- IFF
(Identification, Friend or Foe), for instance -- are unnecessary
for airliner technology, where anything would naturally be
considered "foe" rather than "friend."
If BA is succesful, though, in achieving even the public
relations coup that such an anti-missile system could signal, its
competitive advantage in the market could be considerable: who
would want to fly on the "unprotected" competition?