Role Of ATC Will Be Examined When Determining Cause
In its continuing
investigation of the midair collision of an air tour helicopter and
a small plane over the Hudson River on Saturday, the National
Transportation Safety Board has developed the following factual
information:
On August 8, 2009, at 11:53 a.m. EDT, a Eurocopter AS 350 BA
(N401LH) operated by Liberty Helicopters and a Piper PA-32R-300
(N71MC) operated by a private pilot, collided in midair over the
Hudson River near Hoboken, New Jersey. The certificated commercial
pilot and five passengers onboard the helicopter were killed. The
certificated private pilot and two passengers onboard the airplane
were also killed. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no
flight plans were filed for either flight.
The local sightseeing helicopter flight was conducted under the
provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 136. The personal
airplane flight was conducted under the provisions of 14 Code of
Federal Regulations Part 91. The helicopter departed West 30th
Street Heliport (JRA), New York, New York, for a sightseeing tour
at 11:52 a.m. The airplane departed Teterboro Airport (TEB),
Teterboro, New Jersey, at 11:49 a.m.; destined for Ocean City
Municipal Airport (26N), Ocean City, New Jersey. The airplane pilot
requested an en route altitude of 3500 feet.
Eurocopter AS350 File Photo
According to preliminary radar data, the helicopter turned south
from JRA and climbed to 1,100 feet, with a transponder code of
1200. According to witnesses, the pilot of the helicopter had
transmitted a position report of "Stevens Point" (Stevens Institute
of Technology, Hoboken, New Jersey) on the common traffic advisory
frequency (CTAF), 123.05.
On the day of the accident, Teterboro Air Traffic Control Tower
staff consisted of five controllers. At the time of the accident,
the tower was staffed with two controllers: one controller was
working ground control, local control, and arrival radar, and was
also acting as the controller in charge of the facility. The second
controller was working the flight data/clearance delivery position.
Two other controllers were on break and the front line manager had
left the facility at about 1145.
At 1148:30, the Teterboro tower controller cleared the airplane
for takeoff on frequency 119.50. The first radar target for the
airplane was recorded at 1149:55 as the flight departed runway
19. The tower controller advised the airplane and the pilot
of another helicopter operating in the area of each other and
instructed the pilot of the airplane to remain at or below 1,100
feet. At this time, the tower controller initiated a
non-business-related phone call to Teterboro Airport Operations.
The airplane flew southbound until the controller instructed its
pilot to turn left to join the Hudson River. At 1152:20 the
Teterboro controller instructed the pilot to contact Newark on a
frequency of 127.85; the airplane reached the Hudson River just
north of Hoboken about 40 seconds later. At that time there were
several aircraft detected by radar in the area immediately ahead of
the airplane, including the accident helicopter, all of which were
potential traffic conflicts for the airplane.
The Teterboro tower controller, who was engaged in a phone call
at the time, did not advise the pilot of the potential traffic
conflicts. The Newark tower controller observed air traffic over
the Hudson River and called Teterboro to ask that the controller
instruct the pilot of the airplane to turn toward the southwest to
resolve the potential conflicts. The Teterboro controller then
attempted to contact the airplane but the pilot did not respond.
The collision occurred shortly thereafter. A review of
recorded air traffic control communications showed that the pilot
did not call Newark before the accident occurred.
The helicopter departed from the 30th Street Heliport at 1152
for what was planned to be a 12-minute tour. The initial part
of the tour was to be flown outside class B airspace, so the pilot
was not required to contact air traffic control before or after
departure. The first radar target for the helicopter was
detected by Newark radar at about 1152:27, when the helicopter was
approximately mid-river west of the heliport and climbing through
400 feet.
According to recorded radar data, the helicopter flew to the
west side of the river, and then turned southbound to follow the
Hudson. According to Liberty Helicopters management, this was
the expected path for the tour flight. The helicopter continued
climbing southbound until 1153:14, when
it and the airplane collided at 1,100 feet.
Piper PA32 Saratoga File
Photo
As noted above, immediately after the Teterboro tower controller
instructed the airplane to contact Newark tower on frequency
127.85, the Newark controller called the Teterboro controller to
request that they turn the airplane to a heading of 220 degrees
(southwest) and transfer communications on the aircraft. As
the Newark controller was providing the suggested heading to the
Teterboro controller, the pilot of the airplane was acknowledging
the frequency change to the Teterboro controller. The Teterboro
controller made two unsuccessful attempts to reach the pilot, with
the second attempt occurring at 1152:50. At 1152:54, 20 seconds
prior to the collision, the radar data processing system detected a
conflict between the airplane and the helicopter, which set off
aural alarms and a caused a "conflict alert" indication to appear
on the radar displays at both Teterboro and Newark towers. During
interviews both controllers stated that they did not recall seeing
or hearing the conflict alert. At 1153:19, five seconds after the
collision, the Teterboro controller contacted the Newark controller
to ask about the airplane, and was told that the pilot had not
called. There were no further air traffic control contacts with
either aircraft.
The role that air traffic control might have played in this
accident will be determined by the NTSB as the investigation
progresses. Any opinions rendered at this time are speculative and
premature. Radar data and witness statements indicate that the
aircraft collided at 1,100 feet in the vicinity of Stevens Point.
Most of the wreckage fell in to the Hudson River; however, some
small debris from the airplane, including the right main landing
gear wheel, fell on land within the city limits of Hoboken.
The collision was witnessed by numerous people in the area of
the accident and was immediately reported to local emergency
responders. The helicopter was recovered on August 9, 2009. Most of
the helicopter components were accounted for at the scene, with the
exception of the main rotor and transmission. The airplane was
recovered on August 11, 2009. Most of the airplane components were
accounted for at the scene, with the exception of both wings. The
wreckages were subsequently transported to a secure facility in
Delaware. The pilot of the airplane, age 60, held a private pilot
certificate, with ratings for airplane single-engine land, airplane
multiengine land and instrument airplane. His most recent FAA
third-class medical certificate was issued on May 14, 2009. At that
time he reported a total flight experience of 1,020 hours.
The pilot of the helicopter, age 32, held a commercial pilot
certificate, with ratings for rotorcraft helicopter and instrument
helicopter. His most recent FAA second-class medical certificate
was issued on June 16, 2009. At that time he reported a total
flight experience of 3,010 hours.
Digital photographs and a video recording taken by witnesses to
the accident have been provided to the NTSB. In addition, a
digital camera was recovered from the helicopter. All of
these were sent to the NTSB Vehicle Recorders Laboratory in
Washington, DC for further examination. Global Positioning
System units were recovered from both aircraft and also forwarded
to the NTSB Vehicle Recorders Laboratory.
The recorded weather at TEB at 1151 was wind variable at 3
knots, visibility 10 miles, sky clear.