"Realistically, There Is No Such Thing As A Dangerous Staffing Level"

The National Air Traffic Controllers Association called upon the Federal Aviation Administration Thursday to retract the following statement attributed to FAA spokesperson Ian Gregor in a California newspaper: "Realistically, there is no such thing as a dangerous staffing level."

Gregor, speaking to the North County Times about an ongoing tuberculosis scare at the Southern California Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) facility in Miramar, CA, appeared to be answering a question about the effect on air safety should controllers at the facility become sick when he was quoted as saying the following, "Realistically, there is no such thing as a dangerous staffing level. Safety is always our top priority. In the worst-case scenario, if we did have a bunch of people call in sick, we'd reduce services. We could keep planes further apart. Normally we have them three to five miles apart. We could separate them further and slow down the volume."

"We call on the FAA to reject this comment, recognizing that controller staffing levels are, first and foremost, a safety issue," NATCA President Patrick Forrey said.

"Controllers keep safety as our top priority and we agree with the FAA's stated desire to 'reduce services' for safety reasons when staffing reaches a critical level. But the FAA should never put itself in a position to 'reduce services' and negatively impact the flying public because it failed to staff the system appropriately."

To illustrate his point, Forrey outlined some examples of where slowing traffic to compensate for fewer controllers may have impacted safety:

 An operational error incident on Aug. 17, 2005 at the Raleigh-Durham (NC) tower occurred on a midnight shift where there was only one air traffic controller on duty. The controller had responsibility for nine aircraft; six airborne, one departure and two ground movement, and was watching an additional three.

This event reportedly prompted the FAA's Vice President of Terminal Services to issue guidance reiterating the FAA's policy that during midnight shifts at facilities with both radar and tower functions two controllers should normally be on duty performing those responsibilities.

"Clearly, the FAA determined that there was indeed a dangerous staffing level that must be avoided," Forrey said.

The Comair Flight 5191 crash on the morning of Aug. 27, 2006 occurred during a Lexington, KY, tower midnight shift in which the FAA staffed it with only one controller, instead of the two required by the FAA as per the guidance issued after the Raleigh-Durham incident.

A serious runway incursion occurred on July 5, 2007 involving the New York/JFK tower because of an error made by an overloaded controller working the lone ground control position. The agency did not reduce service or slow the traffic volume, according to the union.

FMI: www.faa.gov, www.natca.org