Aircraft Responded Poorly To Control Inputs

There are few more fear-inducing issues, in-flight, than an aircraft that does not seem to be responding to control. A 1995 Citation VII exhibited just such issues on a December 28th flight starting and ending in Ft. Lauderdale, FL. The crew worked through a number of scenario before getting the aircraft on the ground but based on the limited data here, this flight could have gone FAR worse. We're looking forward to more data as to what caused the issues this crew experienced. The flight was reportedly in the air just a tad over ten minutes...

NTSB Identification: ERA12FA127
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Wednesday, December 28, 2011 in Ft. Lauderdale, FL
Aircraft: CESSNA 650, registration: N877G
Injuries: 8 Uninjured.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.

On December 28, 2011, about 0950 eastern standard time, a Cessna 650, N877G, was substantially damaged when it impacted an airport perimeter fence while returning for landing at Fort Lauderdale Executive Airport (FXE), Fort Lauderdale, Florida. The two crewmembers and six passengers were not injured. The airplane had just taken off from FXE in visual meteorological conditions on an instrument flight rules flight plan to Teterboro Airport (TEB), Teterboro, New Jersey. The personal flight was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91.

According to the first officer, the takeoff roll and rotation from runway 26 were normal, but once airborne, the airplane began rolling to the right. Positive-rate climb was called, but the landing gear remained down and the flaps remained at 20 degrees. The first officer noticed that the captain was having "extreme" difficulty in rolling the airplane level, but eventually accomplished it through rudder and asymmetric thrust. As the right turn brought the airplane around to runway 13, the captain was able to land long, but the airplane then left the runway and impacted the airport perimeter fence. The first officer also noted that there were no warning lights or advisories in the cockpit during the event.

In a written statement, the captain noted that the preflight examination of the airplane was normal, as were the pre-takeoff checks, including the ailerons and all flight control surfaces. After taking off and obtaining a positive rate of climb, the captain found that he needed a "little left control;" then the airplane started a slow right turn which he could not stop. The captain then found that he needed differential thrust and rudder to keep the airplane from rolling over, and as he kept adjusting both, another runway came into view, and he completed the landing.

In a follow-up telephone interview, the captain further stated that as the airspeed increased, the airplane tended to roll more. He recalled thinking that the airplane might have had a flap misconfiguration, but there were no lights or warnings. As he reduced power, the right wing would start to come back up, and as he added differential thrust to maintain altitude, airspeed would increase and the right wing would then fall again. The captain found himself going through the same series of actions over and over again to maintain flight, and as he did so, he saw that the airplane was gradually lining up with runway 13 through the right window. As the airplane came around toward the runway, the captain felt that he only had a "one time shot," and did the best he could to get the airplane onto the runway.

The first officer and a passenger estimated that the maximum roll angle approached 90 degrees of bank.

The airplane was subsequently examined in a hanger, where leading edge wing damage, a slice through the top outer skin and ribs of the cabin, and the nose wheel bent back into the pressure hull with compromised hydraulic lines were documented. Although the captain's yoke pedestal was jammed against the seat, control continuity was confirmed from the cockpit to all flight control surfaces. The flaps remained in the 20-degree position, and all four spoilers on each wing were flush with the wing.

The hydraulic lines in the nose well were subsequently capped and 3,000 pounds of pressure to the hydraulic system were supplied via a hydraulic ground power unit. As soon as the hydraulic pressure was supplied, the right wing roll spoiler (the outermost most of the four spoilers, located next to the aileron) extended upwards 7.9 degrees. Multiple left-right applications of the flight controls, with the hydraulic ground power unit both on and off, resulted in the roll spoiler being extended normally, but returning to a resting position 7.8 to 7.9 degrees above the flush position. A final attempt at exercising the controls resulted in the roll spoiler coming to rest 5.5 degrees above the flush position.

During one of the flight control tests, the spoiler hold-down switch was activated. The right wing roll spoiler then locked down, but when the switch was deactivated, it returned to 7.8 degrees above the flush position.

In preparation for confirmation of proper rigging, an attempt was made to secure the right roll spoiler bellcrank with an alignment pin. As the pin contacted the bellcrank, the bellcrank snapped into a different position which then lowered the roll spoiler to the flush position. The bellcrank and the hydraulic actuator for the right roll spoiler were retained for further examination.

FMI: www.ntsb.gov