Screening Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT)
Highlighted In Congressional Testimony
In testimony Wednesday before the Subcommittee on National
Security, Homeland Defense, and Foreign Operations, Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives, GAO
Director for Homeland Security and Justice Issues Stephen Lord said
that TSA should work to strengthen the Screening Passengers by
Observation Techniques (SPOT) Program to increase aviation
security.
According to the GAO report, the attempted bombing of Northwest
flight 253 in December 2009 underscores the need for effective
aviation security programs. Aviation security remains a daunting
challenge with hundreds of airports, thousands of aircraft, and
thousands of flights daily carrying millions of passengers and
pieces of checked baggage. The Department of Homeland
Security’s (DHS) Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
has spent billions of dollars and implemented a wide range of
aviation security initiatives. As the Government Accountability
Office sees it, three key layers of aviation security are
TSA’s Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques
(SPOT) program, designed to identify persons who may pose a
security risk; airport perimeter and access controls security; and
checked baggage screening systems. Lord's testimony was based on
prior reports GAO issued from September 2009 through July 2011 and
selected updates in June and July 2011. GAO analyzed documents on
TSA’s progress in strengthening aviation security, among
other things.
GAO found in its study that DHS has completed an initial study
to validate the scientific basis of the SPOT program; however,
additional work remains to fully validate the program. GAO reported
in May 2010 that TSA deployed this program, which uses behavior
observation and analysis techniques to identify potentially
high-risk passengers, before determining whether there was a
scientifically valid basis for using behavior and appearance
indicators as a means for reliably identifying passengers who may
pose a risk to the U.S. aviation system. TSA officials said that
SPOT was deployed in response to potential threats, such as suicide
bombers, and was based on scientific research available at the
time.
GAO recommended in May 2010 that DHS, as part of its study,
assess the methodology to help ensure the validity of the SPOT
program. DHS concurred and its April 2011 validation study found
that SPOT was more effective than random screening to varying
degrees. For example, the study found that SPOT was more effective
than random screening at identifying individuals who possessed
fraudulent documents and individuals who were subsequently
arrested. However, DHS’s study was not designed to fully
validate whether behavior detection can be used to reliably
identify individuals in an airport environment who pose a security
risk. The study noted that additional work is needed to
comprehensively validate the program. TSA officials are assessing
the actions needed to address the study’s
recommendations.
In September 2009, GAO reported that since 2004 TSA has taken
actions to strengthen airport perimeter and access controls
security by, among other things, deploying a random worker
screening program; however, TSA has not conducted a comprehensive
risk assessment or developed a national strategy. Specifically, TSA
had not conducted vulnerability assessments for 87 percent of the
approximately 450 U.S. airports regulated by TSA at that time. GAO
recommended that TSA develop both a comprehensive risk assessment
and evaluate the need to assess airport vulnerabilities nationwide,
and a national strategy to guide efforts to strengthen airport
security. DHS concurred and said TSA is developing the assessment
and strategy, but has not yet evaluated the need to assess airport
vulnerabilities nationwide.
GAO reported in July 2011 that TSA revised explosives detection
requirements for its explosives detection systems (EDS) used to
screen checked baggage in January 2010, but faces challenges in
deploying EDS that meet these requirements. Deploying systems that
meet the 2010 EDS requirements could be difficult given that TSA
did not begin deployment of systems meeting the previous 2005
requirements until 2009. As of January 2011 some of the EDS in
TSA’s fleet detect explosives at the level established in
2005 while the remaining EDS detect explosives at levels
established in 1998. Further, TSA does not have a plan to deploy
and operate systems to meet the current requirements and has faced
challenges in procuring the first 260 systems to meet these
requirements. GAO recommended that TSA, among other things, develop
a plan to ensure that EDS are operated at the levels in established
requirements. DHS agreed and has outlined actions to do so.
GAO recommends that TSA strengthen the SPOT program, airport
security efforts, and checked baggage screening efforts. DHS and
TSA generally concurred with the recommendations and have actions
under way to address them.