Maintenance Under The Microscope

In the wake of the Midwest Air crash in Charlotte (NC) earlier this year, the Charlotte Observer has been looking into watchdog complaints about commercial airline maintenance. Now, the paper has dug up a series of Government Accounting Office (GAO) and other federal government reports citing a number of incidents over the past 18 years:

Beginning in 1985, the GAO, the watchdog of Congress, reported on regional differences among FAA safety inspections. Two years later, the GAO pondered maintenance in a deregulated airline economy, suggesting the "fiercely competitive, deregulated environment" could affect aircraft maintenance.

A year later, in 1988, the cabin of an Aloha Airlines was ripped asunder in flight, killing one flight attendant and injuring 61 passengers. This time, the NTSB blamed the FAA for failing to properly monitor aircraft maintenance.

Six years after the Aloha incident, the DOT Inspector General found what it termed widespread use of unapproved parts and outdated maintenance manuals at contract repair stations used by airlines. In that 1994 report, the IG recommended the FAA needed to conduct more detailed inspections of contract maintenance shops. If the FAA didn't beef up inspections, the IG warned, it ran the risk of allowing substandard maintenance that could put lives in jeopardy.

Investigators in the 1997 crash of a ValuJet DC-9 blamed maintenance contractors for the deaths of all 110 people on board. The contractors improperly stowed oxygen canisters in the aircraft's cargo hold. They caught fire, leading to the crash. While the NTSB blamed ValuJet for not properly monitoring its contractor, it also blamed the FAA for its lack of oversight.

The FAA continued taking hits for failing to adequately inspect contract repair shops in the years that followed. In 1998, the GAO recommended FAA inspectors keeping an eye on such facilities work in teams rather than alone. Three years later, the DOT IG determined the FAA wasn't doing enough to make sure airlines policed their own maintenance programs.

After the FAA instituted the Air Transportation Oversight System (ATOS), the DOT IG found major problems in the program. It found the FAA's own inspectors had no confidence in the program and needed to be further trained to properly implement it.

Earlier this year, the GAO condemned the FAA's own training program, saying it was inadequate and outdated -- it hadn't been substantively changed in more than 50 years. Last July, the DOT IG reported contract repair stations, now tasked with performing approximately 50 percent of all commercial passenger aircraft maintenance, were improperly supervised by the FAA. The IG recommended the FAA give its inspectors more time and better resources to do the job right.

FMI: www.gao.gov