Did aviation security improve in the past year, or are we still an accident waiting to happen?

By ANN Associate Editor Juan Jimenez

Since 9/11, the subject of aviation security has morphed from a source of employment for recent immigrants, to one of the top national and international priorities of most countries, developed or not. Clearly, the ability of a group of hijackers to use aircraft as weapons of mass destruction has forever changed the landscape of commercial air travel.

In an ideal world, we wouldn't be discussing this subject, but security in the aviation industry is a huge task that evolves and mutates on almost a daily basis. The reason is simple -- if the threat evolves, so must the defensive strategy to deal with that threat. Ironically, even if the threat is not perceived as an evolving one, any defensive strategy must still evolve to keep the threat from taking advantage of stagnation and habit.

How do we begin to approach the construction of an opinion on the state of aviation security? Aviation security cannot be approached as what it is not, a monolithic entity with a path that clearly defines where it came from and where it is going. Aviation security is a term that encompasses a great number of areas, each with its own requirements, challenges and goals, and within those areas a distinction must be made between general and business aviation and the world of scheduled airline service. That said, let us begin.

Ground Security

In the general aviation arena, the industry has taken a very pro active approach to the security of the premises in and around airports. This is so precisely because access to general aviation facilities has historically been much more open than that of airports with scheduled airline service. Without easy access, it becomes much harder to attract the customers who might become our next generation of pilots, mechanics and other skilled personnel. The more relaxed atmosphere of GA facilities is also crucial to the ability of the airport to serve the needs of those who view it as an easy access point to the community the airport serves, for business or personal reasons.

When it comes to GA airport security, the Aircraft Owner's and Pilots Association has, in our opinion, taken the lead with its comprehensive airport security program. Leveraging the cadre of Airport Support Network volunteers, AOPA has designed and executed a program that tackles the issue from all angles with education programs, videos, posters with warnings and contact information for suspicious activities, and with a constant stream of follow up information and reminders of the importance of GA security.

The program has been very effective, as evidenced by some of the high-profile incidents that have been brought to light after media attempts to gain ratings and circulation numbers at the expense of general aviation. When it comes to GA ground security, 2004 has seen positive change. Besides, it appears that the government has reached the sensible conclusion that things like little badges are not what protects the country from someone hell-bent on using GA aircraft for something other than pleasure or business. Instead, it is the GA community itself, alongside a policy that assumes that anything entering a TFR or other restricted airspace that is not positively identified as a friend is a foe, that keeps GA secure.

Major airports with scheduled service, however, have not fared as well. Airport management teams have certainly stepped up security programs to protect their perimeters and grounds, but there have been a number of incidents in the past year in which we have seen not only unauthorized entries into the facilities, but also individuals exploiting their access to airports to benefit criminal activities. Granted, this last one is nothing new, but one would think that enhanced security would make it much harder to ply trades such as the import of illegal drugs. Southeastern airports seem particularly vulnerable to this type of activity, and there is no escaping the conclusion that if criminals can take advantage of lax security at an airport, so can terrorists.

Another area of scheduled service airport security that could use improvement is that of background check requirements for personnel with unescorted access rights. Instead of trying to run background checks on the passengers and doing silly things like assigning people to color-coded groups -- something this editor had not seen since the days of grade school field days -- the Department of Homeland Security ought to be looking at the most likely source of access to large aircraft by terrorists, ground support personnel. No one should be able to obtain unrestricted access to areas such as aprons and ramps, let alone aircraft, without submitting to a thorough background check. In addition, there should never be a repeat of the February TSA fiasco in which an internal audit found nearly 20,000 screeners working inside the airport secure areas prior to their background checks having been completed.

Passenger and Baggage Security

This subject is almost entirely an airline travel issue, though the business aviation community, and particularly the charter operators, has implemented measures to increase security screening of customers and their accompanying passengers, along with their luggage.

When it comes to airline travel, this is the major issue that easily absorbs the vast majority of funding and thought. The fact is that we have reached the limit of what humans can do to try to ensure that people do not bring prohibited items into aircraft. About the only measure that the TSA can take to improve the job screeners perform without the aid of technology is to do something as simple as ensuring that screening rules and procedures are uniformly applied across the system. There are few things more frustrating than making an outbound trip with part of your belongings but not being able to make the return trip with all your property, and having a screener give you the lamest possible excuse: "If they let you do that at that airport, they were wrong."

In the technological arena, we are definitely making progress towards improving the security of baggage and passengers. Engineers have developed hardware and software that gives screeners the ability to peer into our bags and our bodies in ways no one would have thought possible just a short decade ago. Some feel that technology allows security personnel to see too much of the travelling public, but in our opinion that is the unfortunate price that we must pay in this day and age in order to keep commercial travel as secure as humanly possible.

There are other facets of passenger security that can be improved through technology. One of these is the process of risk assessment, not only to identify threats to security but also to determine what passengers are not a threat to security. The government agencies responsible for aviation security are putting quite a bit of emphasis on the former, but we believe that implementing programs to address the latter might help to significantly improve security. Think about it -- how much information about yourself would you be willing to make available to the government in exchange for not having to make long security lines at the airport? What information would the government want from you in order to grant you expedited passage through security checkpoints? By relieving security agents from most or all of the burden of having to screen you and your baggage, the resources required to do so can spend more time screening other passengers for potential threats.

In our society, where many citizens are wary of giving up their privacy for any reasons, this concept might be more difficult to implement that in other countries where citizens are used to giving up rights and privacy in return for safety. Nevertheless, we believe the idea is worth exploring.

In-Flight Security

There is no doubt that we have made significant progress improving in-flight security in commercial airline travel. The cockpits are now equipped with reinforced doors and surveillance cameras that allow the crew to monitor the cabin. Cabin crews have been pro active in asking for more training and tools to help ensure in-flight safety. The programs meant to provide firearms to cockpit crews are moving along slowly, but in this editor's opinion, this is a good thing.

Clearly there is still much disagreement on whether or not firearms belong in an aircraft in the hands of anyone other than a law enforcement officer with very specific training to perform air marshal duties. Participation in programs to arm cockpit crews with lethal weapons should remain strictly voluntary, and those who choose to participate should be very carefully screened. Much more emphasis should be given to other forms of defense such as non-lethal weapons and the use of flight maneuvers and pressurization equipment as a means of defense against anyone seeking unauthorized access to any airliner cockpit while in flight.

In-Flight Defensive Countermeasures

The use portable defense systems by terrorists in offensive acts against all types of aircraft has become an important issue. There are many types of weapons available to anyone with the right contacts and the right amount of cash which could be used for this purpose, and no shortage of unscrupulous sellers.

Some progress has been made in discussions of how best to deal with this threat, but the biggest roadblock, as usual, is what it will cost to equip aircraft with defenses against the threat, and who will pay the bill. Operators of private and corporate aircraft who believe they are vulnerable to such a threat are free to make their own choices, but most of the nation's airlines are in extremely fragile financial condition and cannot afford to equip their fleet with such equipment. Should the taxpayer take over the burden of paying for something like this, or should those who use the airline services be the ones to pay based on more taxes piled on top of air fares? Perhaps a combination of the two? Should the defenses be active or passive? Those are questions for which answers have yet to be found. Let us hope that those answers are found in a pro active, rather than tragically reactive manner.

In closing, ANN believes that in the areas we have discussed in this piece, we are making progress in aviation security. Every once in a while we take a step backwards, mostly due to human nature and the fact that we are all creatures of habit. However, we are learning from our mistakes, and those whom we have given the responsibility of securing commercial and general aviation are taking their jobs very seriously and working very hard to make sure those mistakes are never repeated.

FMI: www.dhs.gov, www.tsa.gov, www.faa.gov, www.aopa.org