Human Space Flight Commission Report Calls Current Situation An "Unsustainable Trajectory"

The Augustine Commission Report has concluded that to return to the moon, NASA's budget would have to increase by $3 billion per year over the currently budgeted $18 billion. Panel member Edward Crawley, a professor of aeronautics at MIT, told the Associated Press "Under the budget that was proposed, exploration beyond Earth is not viable."

That leaves the Obama administration with essentially two options, according to former NASA Administrator and commission member Alan Stern. Obama faces a choice of "essentially abandoning human spaceflight" or paying the extra money, he told the news service.

The summary report, which was posted Tuesday on the NASA and White House websites, says the committee identified a number of alternatives for the Human Spaceflight Program. It found:
Human exploration beyond low-Earth orbit is not viable under the FY 2010 budget guideline.
Meaningful human exploration is possible under a less constrained budget, ramping to approximately $3 billion per year above the FY 2010 guidance in total resources.
Funding at the increased level would allow either an exploration program to explore Moon First or one that follows a Flexible Path of exploration. Either could produce results in a reasonable timeframe.

The report makes a case for extending the life of the shuttle program. "Although a thorough analysis of Shuttle safety was not part of its charter, the Committee did examine the Shuttle’s safety record and reliability. New human-rated launch vehicles will likely be more reliable once they reach maturity, but in the meantime, the Shuttle is in the enviable position of being through its infant mortality phase. Its flight experience and  demonstrated reliability should not be discounted.

Once the Shuttle is retired, there will be a gap in America’s capability to launch humans into space. That gap will extend until the next U.S. human-rated launch system becomes available. The Committee estimates that, under the current plan, this gap will be at least seven years long. There has not been this long a gap in U.S. human launch capability since the U.S. human space program began," the report says.

Not to mention, the report says later, that the ISS is scheduled to be retired before the next U.S. human launch vehicle is now expected to be ready, leaving the Orion as a spacecraft with no place to go.

Orion Spacecraft Artist's Rendering

The report does indicate that commercial space ventures can play a key role in reducing the costs of human space flight. "It seems improbable that significant reductions in launch costs will be realized in the short term until launch rates increase substantially—perhaps through expanded commercial activity in space," the report says, and then mentions the possibility of guaranteed contracts for space companies much like the Air Mail service helped foster the growth of commercial airlines. "The Committee concludes that an architecture for exploration employing a similar policy of guaranteed contracts has the potential to stimulate a vigorous and competitive commercial space industry. Such commercial ventures could include supply of cargo to the ISS (already underway), transport of crew to orbit and transport of fuel to orbit. Establishing these commercial opportunities could increase launch volume and potentially lower costs to NASA and all other launch-services customers."

The report lays out the different scenarios for exploration beyond low earth orbit, including Moon First, Mars First, and a "Flexible Option." But funding is the key factor in all of these options, and while "The Committee has found two executable options that comply with the FY 2010 budget ... neither allows for a viable exploration program. In fact, the Committee finds that no plan compatible with the FY 2010 budget profile permits human exploration to continue in any meaningful way."

Which puts the U.S. Manned Space Program on what the report calls in its opening sentence an "unsustainable trajectory."

FMI: www.nasa.gov/pdf/384767main_SUMMARY%20REPORT%20-%20FINAL.pdf