Factual Reports Shows A Full Inspection Of The Fuel System May
Not Have Been Performed
The NTSB has released its factual report for an accident which
occurred July 23rd, 2010, in which four of the five people aboard a
Cessna 206 were fatally injured.
The airplane was ditched in Lake Michigan about 5 miles west of
Ludington, Michigan, after a loss of engine power. The airplane was
owned and operated by the pilot as a personal flight under 14 Code
of Federal Regulations Part 91. It departed the Gratiot Community
Airport (AMN), Alma, Michigan, at 0850 local time and was en route
to Rochester International Airport (RST), Rochester, Minnesota. The
single-engine airplane was over Lake Michigan at 10,000 feet above
mean sea level (msl) when the engine lost power. The pilot reversed
course but was unable to reach the shore, and he ditched the
airplane. The pilot survived and was rescued by a fishing boat
about 38 minutes later. The pilot rated passenger and three other
passengers did not survive. Visual meteorological conditions
prevailed at the time of the accident. An instrument flight rules
(IFR) flight plan was activated.
On July 23, 2010, about 0659, the pilot rated passenger called
the Princeton Automated Flight Service Station to obtain a weather
brief and to file an IFR flight plan. The briefer informed him that
there was an airmen's meteorological information (AIRMET) for IFR
conditions for the entire route of flight that was valid until
about 1100 - 1400. There was a Convective significant
meteorological information (SIGMET) to the south that paralleled
the route of flight. The briefer reported that the winds aloft were
from 260 degrees at 41 knots at 9,000 feet, and 270 degrees at 35
knots at 12,000 feet. The pilot rated passenger filed the flight
plan and identified the flight as a "lifeguard" flight.
The pilot reported that the purpose of the flight was to take
one of the passengers to the Mayo Clinic in Rochester, Minnesota,
for medical treatments. The flight was a personal flight and was
not associated with a charity organization. The patient and his
wife were seated in the aft seats, seats 5 and 6. The patient's
doctor was sitting in the middle row on the left in seat 3. The
pilot was in the left front seat and the pilot rated passenger was
in the right front seat, seat 2. The fuel tanks were filled to
capacity the night before the flight. The pilot reported that after
climbing to 10,000 feet msl, he leaned the fuel mixture to
approximately 14 gallons per hour (gph).
The pilot reported that all of the instrument readings were
within normal limits as they crossed the shore near Ludington,
Michigan. The head winds were about 40 knots "directly on the
nose." Near mid-point over the lake (about 24 statute miles from
the shoreline), the engine began to misfire and lose power, with
the fuel flow dropping to about 11 gph. The pilot attempted to
regain power by pushing in the mixture control to full rich but
without effect. About 1005, the pilot contacted the Minneapolis Air
Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) and reported that the airplane
was losing power. He reversed course toward the Michigan shoreline.
The fuel flow dropped to about 8 gph. The pilot switched fuel tanks
and adjusted the mixture control in and out to try to regain power.
He attempted to prime the engine but that had no effect. He
reported that he turned on the high boost pump and got a short
burst of power for about 30 - 45 seconds, but then the engine
"failed completely."
The airplane descended through a cloud layer. About 1012, the
airplane was about 12 miles from Ludington and about 2,300 feet
above mean sea level (msl) and the airplane was still in the
clouds. The surface weather at Ludington indicated that the cloud
bases were at 1,800 feet msl. The pilot reported that they had a
few minutes before water impact after breaking out of the clouds,
so he had everyone don and inflate their life vests. Before impact,
the pilot unlatched the pilot's door on the left side of the
airplane, and he had the front door of the rear cargo door
unlatched. The pilot reported that he did not lower the flaps since
the cargo doors would not open if the flaps were extended.
The pilot reported that when he ditched the airplane, either the
tail or the landing gear hit the water as he pulled up to go over a
swell. The airplane pitched forward, flipped over on its back, and
began to fill with water. The pilot unbuckled his seat belt and
shoulder harness, fell a short distance, pushed the door open, and
got out. He reported that the airplane was sinking rapidly. He saw
the right seat passenger and the doctor in the water. A wave hit
the pilot and when he resurfaced "everything was gone." He kept
yelling but got no response. He eventually started to swim toward
the shoreline. About 30 minutes later a US Coast Guard helicopter
flew over him but they did not spot him. A few minutes later a
fishing boat spotted him and rescued him from the water. He was
transferred to a Coast Guard vessel and was taken to shore.
Using side scanning sonar, the Michigan State Police Dive Team
located the airplane in about 173 feet of water on July 30. The
dive team recovered all the bodies, with the last body being
recovered on the morning of August 1, 2010.
The airplane was found resting on its main landing gear on the
sandy lake bottom. The airframe and engine were separated by the
water impact. Both were raised to the surface by a local commercial
recovery service on August 1, 2010. The airframe and engine were
taken to a local facility where the National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB) conducted its on-site investigation.
The airplane's maintenance logbooks indicated that four
different inspection authorization (IA) mechanics had conducted the
required annual maintenance inspections on the airplane within the
last ten years. The logbooks indicated that the same IA mechanic
had performed the last three annual maintenance inspections. On
September 27, 2007, the IA mechanic performed his first annual
maintenance inspection of the airplane. The total airframe time was
3,893.4 hours. His second annual inspection of the airplane was
conducted on October 1, 2008, and the airplane had a total time of
3,908.1 hours. The last annual maintenance inspection was conducted
on November 5, 2009, and it had a total time of 3,938.0 hours. At
the time of the accident, the airplane had flown 7.5 hours since
the last inspection and had a total time of 3,945.5 hours.
FAA inspectors interviewed the IA mechanic concerning the annual
maintenance inspections he had conducted on the accident airplane.
According to the FAA inspectors, the IA mechanic reported that he
used the inspection checklists provided by the pilot/owner in order
to conduct the annual maintenance inspections. The pilot/owner
provided the IA mechanic with the Cessna Service Manual for
"Stationair Series, Skywagon 206 Series and Super Skylane Series,
1969 thru 1971." The service manual indicated the items that needed
to be inspected during a 50-hour inspection and 100-hour (annual)
inspection. In the section of the checklist covering the "Engine
Compartment," Item 29 states that the "Fuel-air control unit
screen" is required to be checked during every 100-hour inspection.
In the section of the checklist covering the "Fuel System," Item 2
states that the "Fuel strainer screen and bowl" is required to be
checked during every 100-hour inspection.
File Photo
The Emergency Procedure section of the airplane Owner's Manual
provides the procedures for "Ditching." The ditching procedures
state:
- Plan approach into wind if winds are high and seas are heavy.
With heavy swells and light wind, land parallel to swells.
- Approach with flaps 40 degrees and sufficient power for a 300
ft./min rate of descent at 75 MPH.
- Unlatch the cabin door.
- Maintain a continuous descent until touchdown in level
attitude. Avoid a landing flare because of difficulty in judging
airplane height over a water surface.
- Place folded coat or cushion if front of face at time of
touchdown.
- Evacuate airplane through cabin doors. If necessary, open
window to flood cabin compartment for equalizing pressure so that
door can be opened.
- Inflate life vests and raft (if available) after evacuation of
cabin.
The airplane's Owner's Manual states that when conducting the
"Before Entering the Airplane" checklist during the preflight, it
is important check the cargo doors are securely latched and locked.
An "IMPORTANT" note states:
"The cargo doors must be fully
closed and latched before operating the electric wing flaps. A
switch in the upper door sill of the front cargo door interrupts
the wing flap electrical circuit when the front door is opened or
removed, thus preventing the flaps being lowered with possible
damage to the cargo door or wing flaps when the cargo door is
open."
The Owner's Manual section titled "Cargo Door Emergency Exit"
states the following information:
"If it is necessary to use the
cargo door as an emergency exit and the wing flaps are not
extended, open the forward door and exit. If the wing flaps are
extended, open the doors in accordance with the instructions shown
on the placard which is mounted on the forward cargo
door."
The red placard found on the front cargo door of the accident
airplane stated:
- EMERGENCY EXIT OPERATIONS
- OPEN FWD CARGO DOOR AS FAR AS POSSIBLE.
- ROTATE RED LEVER IN REAR CARGO DOOR FWD.
- FORCE REAR CARGO DOOR FULL OPEN.
The engine was sent to the manufacturer for inspection and
operational testing. The engine was put on a test stand and run.
The engine experienced a normal start. The engine RPM was advanced
to 1,200 rpm and held for 5 minutes to stabilize; 1,600 rpm and
held for 5 minutes to stabilize; 2,450 rpm and held for 5 minutes
to stabilize; and at full throttle and held for 5 minutes to
stabilize. The throttle was rapidly advanced from idle to full
throttle six times and it accelerated and decelerated without
hesitation or interruption in power. It produced rated
horsepower.
The NTSB Materials Laboratory examined the debris found in the
fuel metering assembly's fuel inlet screen. The examination of the
material removed from the filter revealed several categories of
materials present within the mixture. The materials present
included: 1) cellulosic material similar to wood and sawdust; 2)
non-metallic amber-colored flakes similar to varnish or shellac; 3)
thin, ribbon-like metallic shavings; 4) white flakes similar to
paint; 5) granular particulates similar to sand or dirt; and 6)
fibers similar to fabric and glass fibers.
NTSB Public Affairs Officer Keith Holloway said the probable
cause report is still pending.