CAIB Testimony Shows Computer Sim Ignored

The government-sponsored investigation into the destruction of the space shuttle Columbia has confirmed what ANN first reported last month ( Feb 24: "Is Columbia Investigation Plagued By Inexperience?") - that engineers at shuttle contractor Boeing blew off computer projections of a possible disaster as faulty.

A computer simulation warned NASA's doomed Columbia space shuttle faced potential disaster upon re-entry. Instead of heeding the warning system, developed for precicely this scenario, Boeing engineers rejected it as inaccurate by engineers, according to testimony before the Columbia review board.

Details of the alleged blunder emerged as part of the official inquiry into the shuttle's crash. The cause of the disintegration is still unknown. Investigators, however, are more and more focused on the damage done to Columbia's heat-shielding tiles by debris that fell from the shuttle's fuel tank and slammed into its wing 82 seconds after take-off.

The Boeing simulation, conducted while the orbiter was in still circling the Earth, showed as many as 15 tiles from the shuttle's heat shield may have been knocked off the underside of the left wing by that debris. Knowing so many tiles were at risk would have been a clear warning to NASA of impending disaster. But Boeing engineers decided the computer had exaggerated the threat – and their report to NASA assessed the risk on the basis that only one tile had been damaged.

Sharing The Early Blame

Experts also blamed NASA for accepting Boeing's report – parts of which were incomplete – without question.

"NASA's acceptance of that report, and the failure to go deeper, was fatally flawed," said Paul Fischbeck of Carnegie Mellon University in Pittsburgh, an expert on shuttle tile damage who has given evidence to the inquiry.

"It is something that will haunt this investigation and which should haunt all those involved."

Details of the decision to overrule the simulation emerged in papers submitted to the Columbia Accident Investigation Board, which held its first public hearing last week in Houston.

Senior engineers at Boeing's Huntington Beach (CA) facility, asking to remain unnamed, said the STS-107 team of contractors based at the Johnson Space Center in Houston (TX) were inexperienced. The Huntington Beach engineers, some with more than 20 years' experience troubleshooting the space shuttles, said STS-107 was the Houston team's first real-life experience with a shuttle mission. The Boeing engineers in California said the Houston study was so tragically flawed, that they've started their own analysis of the damage caused to Columbia when the chunks of insulating foam impacted the left wing shortly after launch.

From Boeing: Only Silence So Far

Boeing has not publicly responded to the allegations and would not comment last week. The inquiry is expected to call Boeing engineers and executives to give evidence at a later date. Their evidence may be crucial. The 13-strong CAIB inquiry panel is now convinced that the shuttle was destroyed when gases, heated by the extreme temperatures of re-entry, penetrated its heat shield. The white-hot plasma is thought to have thought to have burned its way into the shuttle's left wing, either through its leading edge or through the landing gear compartment.

Evidence for this includes the discovery of molten aluminium on some of the tiles seemingly confirming a 2000 degree meltdown of the left wing.

"Eerily Prescient"

But the blame for the accident is spreading much further than Boeing. The inquiry also heard last week how NASA had clear warnings that it was cutting safety margins to the bone. Harry McDonald, the former Scottish-born director of NASA's Ames Research Centre in California, described how he wrote a report in 2000 highlighting the organisation's flawed decision-making and poor communications over safety risks.

The CAIB, which is leading the inquiry into Columbia's break-up, described the report as "eerily prescient".

Dr McDonald said in his evidence last week that NASA engineers lacked a fundamental understanding of risks and often failed to detect subtle but potentially disastrous problems.

He also suggested that the safety recommendations he made in his report might have saved the shuttle if they had not been ignored.

Could the Columbia Seven Have Been Saved?

One key question for NASA is whether or not it could have done anything to save the crew while in orbit if it had known about the danger to it.

NASA and its contractors already are doing the planning and engineering work necessary to launch another shuttle no later than summer 2004, shuttle program sources told Florida Today.

The work to recover from the accident and return to flight is occurring parallel with the investigation into the cause of the Columbia disaster so shuttles can launch as soon as possible to support the International Space Station.

A manager in the shuttle program said separate work plans are being developed based on a range of circumstances and dates, from as early as this July and as late as summer 2004. Obviously the findings of the Columbia investigation will dictate the timeline, but NASA and shuttle contractors have decided to be smart about using this down time rather than just waiting around. 

FMI: www.caib.us