The preliminary NTSB investigation (published below) into a tragic fatal R44 (file pix, below) accident is turning up some worrisome details. The March 27th, 2007, accident near Jacksonville, FL, resulted in the deaths of the two pilots aboard, Flight Instructor and Silver State employee Tamara Williams, 38, of California, and student Justin Ducan, 24, of Jacksonville, FL. What seems worrisome, according to the NTSB report, is the "missing" attach hardware discussed in the report and the fact that the accident occurred shortly after maintenance. ANN is attempting to get a statement and some background from Silver State Helicopters about the matter and will keep you updated as the investigation proceeds... 

NTSB Identification: DEN07FA079
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Tuesday, March 27, 2007 in Ponte Verde Bch, FL
Aircraft: Robinson R44 II, registration: N744SH
Injuries: 2 Fatal.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.

On March 27, 2007, approximately 1030 eastern daylight time, a Robinson R44 II single-engine helicopter, was destroyed when it impacted terrain following a loss of control during cruise flight near Ponte Verde Beach, Florida. The flight instructor and student pilot were fatally injured. The helicopter was registered to and operated by Silver State Helicopters, LLC, North Las Vegas, Nevada. Day visual meteorological conditions prevailed and a company visual flight rules flight plan was filed for the Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 instructional flight. The local flight departed the Craig Municipal Airport (CRG), Jacksonville, Florida, approximately 1010.

According to Silver State personnel, the local flight was scheduled for a time block between the hours of 0900 and 1100. The instructional flight was originally scheduled to be conducted in the R22; however, due to a scheduling conflict, the R22 was not available. Due to the conflict, the Silver State local management then allowed the instructor and student to conduct an orientation and familiarization flight in the R44 helicopter. The route of flight was scheduled for a east departure from CRG, south along the Atlantic Ocean coastline to St. Augustine, then back to CRG.

Several witnesses observed the helicopter approximately 200-500 feet above ground level (agl) in cruise flight along the coastline on a south heading. One witness, a former pilot and mechanic, reported he observed the helicopter in straight and level flight, then heard a change in "rotor noise, followed by a bang/pop/twang sound." The helicopter then "snap-rolled" to the left and descended into the terrain in a nose low attitude. The helicopter impacted the sand terrain, bounced, and came to rest near the low tide water line. A post-impact fire ensued and extinguished itself a short time thereafter.

The main wreckage came to rest on the beach at 30 degrees 13.54 minutes north latitude and 81 degrees 22.32 minutes west longitude. The initial impact point, consistent with the fuselage, was a 4-foot crater in the sand terrain located at the high tide waterline. The helicopter wreckage was distributed along a measured magnetic heading of approximately 160 degrees from the initial impact point. The main wreckage came to rest approximately 100 feet from the initial impact point. The main wreckage consisted of the fuselage, main rotor assembly, tailboom and tail rotor. Several fragmented pieces of the fuselage and skid tubes were located between the initial impact and main wreckage. The engine was separated from the airframe and came to rest adjacent to the main wreckage. Due to tide change, the wreckage was recovered under the supervision of a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector to a facility at CRG.

Examination of the helicopter by the NTSB investigator-in-charge, FAA inspectors, and representatives from the airframe and engine manufacturers revealed that the fuselage sustained thermal damage and impact damage to the right side. The forward section of the tailboom, lower mast, and engine cowling sustained thermal damage. Examination of the flight control system revealed that the right forward servo to swashplate push/pull tube fitting was disconnected and the attach hardware (bolt, lock nut, two washers, pal nut) was missing. The left forward servo to swashplate push/pull fitting was connected; however, the lock nut was found partially engaged on the bolt threads and the torque was "finger tight"; no pal nut was noted. The aft servo and push/pull tube fitting was secured with the appropriate hardware.

The swashplate push/pull tubes are connected to the swashplate assembly and the upper linkage of the servos. The bottom linkage of the servos is connected to a bellcrank/fork assembly which then connect to the cyclic and collective thru a series of push/pull tubes and bellcranks. The three servos support the main rotor swashplate and hydraulically boost the main rotor flight controls to eliminate cyclic and collective feedback forces.

On March 26, 2007, the aircraft was returned to service after a 100/300 hour inspection was performed and mast fairing ribs were removed and replaced. During the mast fairing rib replacement, the swashplate push/pull tubes were removed. Prior to the aircraft being returned to service, a 0.5 hour maintenance test flight was performed by the mechanic and a company pilot. The accident flight was the first flight performed after the maintenance test flight.

FMI: www.ntsb.gov, www.silverstatehelicopters.com