Says System Could Have Prevented UPS DC-8 Blaze

On Tuesday, the National Transportation Safety Board called upon the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to require all cargo airplanes operating under Part 121 Code of Federal Regulations install fire suppression systems. The recommendation came as a result of the Board's investigation of a UPS DC-8 cargo fire in Philadelphia last year.

Also this week, the Board released its probable cause report on that incident -- ruling an in-flight fire initiated from an unknown source within one of the containers in the main cargo compartment.

As ANN reported, overheating lithium battery cells were believed to be the culprit throughout the investigation into the February 7, 2006 incident. The NTSB couldn't confirm those beliefs with the evidence at hand, though it did note several devices onboard did contain such batteries.

Regardless of what caused the fire, the report concluded the threat from cargo fires could be mitigated by the installation of fire suppression systems.

"While we may not know the source of the fire which caused this accident, our investigators have done an excellent job of highlighting possible solutions that will address hazards associated with in-flight fires," said NTSB Chairman Mark V. Rosenker.

In its report, the NTSB states examinations of the recovered components revealed no evidence of any preexisting powerplant, structural, or system failures. Also noted was that given the length of time that the fire burned and the resulting destruction of potentially helpful evidence, the post-fire condition of the cargo containers and contents and the surrounding airplane structure provided no evidence that indicated what initiated the fire.

Investigators also reviewed the fire and smoke detection system certification requirements. In the Board's determination, the examination revealed the current certification test standards and guidance for smoke or fire detection systems onboard many aircraft are not adequate -- as they do not account for the effects of cargo containers on airflow around the detection sensors and on the containment of smoke from a fire inside a container.

The report states evidence indicates that the fire initially did not generate a significant amount of smoke, and most likely initiated as a smoldering fire inside a cargo container. The construction of the cargo containers, which results in restricted airflow in or out of the container, likely inhibited the growth and detection of the fire in its initial stages.

"We have identified several safety issues where improvements in the aviation cargo industry could make transporting of goods safer. Our safety recommendations are essential tools that if implemented can ensure that this will happen," Rosenker said.

As a result of its investigation, the Safety Board made recommendations in the following areas including: guidance and checklists relating to in-flight fire and smoke, certification requirements for smoke and fire detection system tests, fire suppression system requirements, aircraft rescue and firefighting training, cargo airplane emergency exit requirements, hazardous materials information and dissemination procedures, and transport of lithium batteries on board aircraft.

These recommendations were addressed to the Federal Aviation Administration, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, and the Cargo Airline Association.

FMI: www.ntsb.gov